course ofmy linguistic instruction, it occurred to me that while fluency in German and, indeed, French might be desirable, together with a knowledge of the respective literatures, there might nonetheless be a limit to the practical utility to be gained. So, probably a little later than many present this evening, I
came to think that science and, after a little more thought, engineering offered better possibilities for making a useful contribution. And this change in my career path caused me to encounter a whole new set ofGermanic names, including those contained in the title of this talk, as I shall now explain.
Given my academic history, it was not unnatural that I had to spend my pre-university year catching up on Maths and Physics in order to satisfy the entrance requirements for a degree course in engineering. I remember that I found A-level physics hard work but fascinating. And one feature that stood out clearly was the extraordinary precision of many of the ground-breaking measurements.
For example, I and my colleagues were taught about Millikan's experiments to determine the charge on the electron, leading to the value of Coulombs -amazing to be able to measure something that tiny, and with such precision. No matter that our practicals never seemed to produce anything like this degree of accuracy, it was clearly the ultimate aim. Even if we could not achieve it now, my colleagues and I thought a short spell at university would obviously do the trick! So you can imagine my shock when, in one of the fIrst classes at university, my control engineering lecturer commented that a measurement accuracy of 10% was quite reasonable for many industrial quantities, 5% was good and 3% was often as good as it gets! This was my fIrst introduction to the important culture of realism that is common to all engineers: engineering is the art of making desirable things happen, even in the face ofimper- fect theory, imperfect data and less than generous resources! The point was underlined for me a few years later, after I joined ICI, when a senior engineer summed up his philosophy somewhat cynically with the saying: "Measure it using a micrometer, mark it with chalk, then cut it with an axe". This was not an argument for the use of brute force and ignorance, but an acceptance that in this world, good results have usually to be produced with the tools at hand.
ICI, during my time on Teesside was all about large, complicated plants with high throughputs, where a percentage point increase in the quantity produced would mean an enormous gain in profIt. Agricultural Division's most important installations were its ammonia plants, which fIxed nitrogen for subsequent conversion into fertilisers. The plants were based on the Haber-Bosch process, invented just after the turn of the twentieth century by two Nobel-Prize-winning German chemists, Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch. Their process was ftrst applied on an industrial scale by BASF in Germany in 1913.
Hydrogen and nitrogen are combined by a gaseous, exothermic reaction at high pressure (about 200 bar) and elevated temperature ( about 500°C) and the reacted gas is then chilled to about _6°C so as to drop out liquid ammonia product. The conversion per pass is only of the order of 11 %, so a recycle loop is essential to obtain a reasonable conversion efficiency.
I would draw your attention to the size and complexity of the plant shown in the fIgure, which I suggest are evident even after the simplifIcation needed for display pur- the engineering ideal: much ingenuity and mathematical analysis have been required to generate and validate the idea, but the insight translates into a very simple procedure for practical application. I am reminded once more of the saw: "Measure it using a micrometer, mark it with chalk, then cut it with an axe". And, important to note, the ammonia optimisation exercise led to hundreds of thousands of pounds per year of increased profit.
I left ICI to practise control engineering in the nuclear industry, working for the UK Atomic Energy Authority, initially at Winfrith. But the plant got no simpler.
The main features of the boiler feedwater system are shown in Figure 2 . The feedwater valve is adjusted by the level controller, while the power supplied to the pump by its drive turbine is varied so as to keep a constant pressure drop across the feedwater valve.
As a general principle, it is sensible to exclude from consideration those parts of the plant whose influence on the problem in hand is small, but even so most of the components shown in the larger plant diagram needed to be 0------;
included in the simulation model (although the mathematical characterisation of the main turbine could be rather simple). A full understanding of the problem required the efforts of a small team, and here I should like to acknowledge the hard work of my co-workers, Tim Harrison and Paul Hollywel1. In addition to the main time-domain simulation, we had to develop two frequency-domain models 7 , apply new multivariable control methods 8 and develop new theory to cover dynamic interactions between recirculation boilers connected in parallel 9 . Finally we were able to show that there was not just one oscillation but three! And one mode of oscillation could change into another either spontaneously or as a result of operator action.
Simulated oscillations have been shown, but I should emphasise that very similar oscillations were observed on the plant.
The work on understanding the drum-level control problem was at the scientific end of the engineering spectrum; in terms of the metaphor 1 mentioned earlier: "measure it using a micrometer". But engineering cannot end there. What about "marking it with chalk and cutting it with an poses. The plant contains a lot of powerful, rotating machinery: both compressor and circulator, each driven by a dedicated steam turbine. The slide highlights also the high degree of interaction induced by the regenerative effect of many of the heat exchangers, included to maximise thermal efficiency.
It is the control engineer's job to devise the strategy for controlling such a plant, and to convert that strategy into practical control and instrumentation hardware. But the first and most difficult task facing the control engineer working in the process industries is simply to understand properly how the plant works. What causes what effect, and how long does it take before a quarter of the effect, half the effect and finally the full effect are seen on the plant?
This fundamental problem is tackled through the use of mathematical modelling and computer simulation, validated by plant measurements where these are available. I remember modelling and simulating several subsystems on ICI's Ammonia 4 plant on Teesside, including the refrigeration loop, which was itself a complex piece of plant, with its own 3-stage compressor, drawing from and discharging to five vessels full of boiling ammonia. The model's speed of solution benefited markedly from "Bob" Martin's method} for solving the dynamic equations for single-component boiling. Many years later this Institute was to award me its ICI Prize for generalising this method to the solution of a set of general implicit equations 2 • 3 • 4 within a dynamic simulation.
But a neat mathematical model is not enough on its own, even if it is found to tally well with available plant measurements. The structure ofthe model should be such as to allow the control engineer to fmd a satisfying and hopefully quantitative explanation of cause and effect. And the model really proves its worth when it helps to generate new insights.
A good example of a model that did generate new insights was Tony Stephens's dynamic model of the ammonia synthesis 100p5. This computer simulation was used to re-design the control scheme for an ammonia converter. The original scheme had attempted to control the outlet temperature of each of the catalyst beds making up the shot converter. But this had shown poor stability in the face of large upsets, because of both the long time it took for a thermal wave to propagate through the bed and also the inverse response of bed outlet temperature to varying the input of the cooler but more reactive shot gas. The solution to the problem, tested on the dynamic model and then transferred to the plant, was to transfer control to the temperature at the inlet of each bed. This is the control scheme displayed on the slide.
The simulation was then used to show that the new control scheme eliminated the interactions between the catalyst beds, allowing the efficiency of ammonia production to be maximised by finding the best inlet temperature for each of the catalyst beds in turn. The final insight was based on the contraction in molar volume that occurs as the ammonia reaction proceeds. Hence under conditions of constant feed to the synthesis loop, any improvement in efficiency will be accompanied by a fall in the synthesis loop pressure. Thus the best inlet temperature for each bed could be found experimentally on the plant simply by varying the temperature set point until the loop pressure in the steady state reached a minimum.
In many ways, this example of ammonia loop optimisation (which applies equally to a methanolloop6) represents For the drum-level control system, the key insight was that the gain of the differential-pressure control loop had to be kept high at all times. Redesigning the control system at a single operating point was now easy, but the problem was that the loop included the complex machinery of the boiler feedpump and its drive turbine, whose combined gain varied by a factor of ten to one between high and low power, and in a highly non-linear, indeed non-monotonic fashion. Theoretically the gain could have been evaluated using the same model as was used in the simulation, but in practice this would have been prone to calculational breakdown ifused on-line.
Fortunately it was possible to simplify the mathematical descriptions of the main plant items to a level where we were able to programme a relatively simple and explicit gain-scheduling algorithm that was based on measured feedpump and turbine parameters1O. This was our version of "marking it with chalk and cutting it with an axe".
So far I have talked about control engineering applied in the conventional sense to industrial processes. But oscillations -a source of continual fascination for the control engineer -oscillations are not confined to process plant.
lCI's control engineers spent a lot of time analysing business cycles in the 1970's and 1980's, and the Divisional Boards found the results essential for planning both their production and their recruitment. ICI's engineers concluded that the UK economy exhibited a statistically significant and rather stable cycle of about 52 months in duration. Taking into account the inherent growth in the economy, this leads to the rule of thumb: "3 years up and 1 year down." Not much cheer here for a Chancellor of the Exchequer who hopes to eliminate boom and bust! But it is an example of a policy area where control engineering skills have an important part to play. Some of the results have a strong relevance to us all. For example, the main headline on the front page of The Daily Telegraph on 1 August 200 I: "House price hoom amid jobs gloom. Home owners warned of 'unsustainable' rise". Well, not all newspaper headlines are true. On 21st May 2001, the Evening Standard carried the rather dramatic headline: "Fire destroys City University". Fortunately you cannot believe everything you read in the newspapers, and there are a number ofus here tonight who are rather grateful that this particular headline was something of an exaggeration! So how right is the prediction of the house price rise being unsustainable? Most commentary concentrates on rather technical factors: interest rates, average earnings, the withdrawal ofMlRAS, the value of the FTSEI00, and so on. But ICI's control engineers saw things rather differently.
It I think that you will agree that we have seen this prediction validated rather well over the ensuing 20 years.
The forecast was based on an intellectually satisfying explanation for a key component of cause and effect, namely demographic trends, specifically the variation in the number of 20-24 year-olds who would constitute the bulk of the first time buyers driving the market.
Based on this, one might expect a steady increase in housing demand and hence prices for the next decade, with a correction possible round about 2012. You have seen the graph, and you may make up your own minds! The ICI engineers engaged in this area were strongly influenced by the work of the American electrical and control engineer, Jay Forrester, who pioneered what he called "System Dynamics", that is to say the application ofmathematical modelling and simulation to the management of companies and economies.
The UK has been the world-leader in the deregulation of its multi-billion-pound electricity generation and supply industry. The novelty of this radical re-organisation meant that little or no historic data were available early on, anywhere in the world, from which to judge likely effects. This is a prime situation where a mathematical model is needed, and Erik Larsen, of City University Business School and Derek B\UU1 of the London Business School, used the system dynam- 
market, and also pointed up failings in the design of the remaining regulations. An early conclusion was tbat National Power would be unable to keep its market share in the long tenn, and that its share of tbe market would fall from 50% to 30% over time. In fact National Power came to this realisation quite quickly and sought to manage a decline in its UK. market share, not least to reduce its exposure to UK regulatory risk.
PA Consulting is a market-leader in applying system dynamics to tbe management oflarge engineering projects, including mUlti-billion-dollar projects to build new aeroplanes, such as the Joint Strike Figbter, which is a highly complex aircraft. Building it will call for the combined technical skills of many organisations from many countries. The project will be subject to its own internal dynamics, which are analogous to the dynamics of a physical system such as tbe Haber-Bosch process I discussed earlier.
The dynamics of high-technology projects are often dominated by the need to modify calculations and designs in the light of emerging knowledge -this is known as the rework cycle. An intriguing result found from simulation was that imposing a cap on manpower reduced the total mandays required for the project, although at the expense of a 3-month delay to completion. In effect, the mathematical model is confirming the adage "Too many cooks spoil the broth". I am happy to say that PA's David Stupples, a Visiting Professor in the School of Engineering at Cit)' University, is working with us to instal] a system dynamics simulation of a large aircraft project. This will form part of the management course for City's students reading for a Master of Engineering degree.
I have mentioned regulatory risk, and risk, especially safety and economic risk, is a topic weU-known to C&I engineers working on protection systems. The subject bas been the focus of many Institute events, starting in the early 1980 's with the series of symposia on Micro-Processor-Based Protection Systems and now carrying on under the aegis of the Institute's newly formed Safety Panel. And assessing risk plays an important part in all our daily lives, engineers or not Quantitative risk assessment was pioneered in the nuclear industry, and my own introduction to Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) occurred dwing my time working for Lord Marsbal! on the Sizewell 'B' Public Inquiry.
The requirement was to show that the frequency of a severe accident, leading to an uncontrolled release of radionuclides, would be once in a million years or less. An exceptionally wide range of analysis methods was needed, stretching from sophisticated mathematics and computing on the one side, to research into historic ledgers on the other -records of slates falling from monastery roofs providing clues to the frequency of East Anglian earthquakes! Despite their apparent precision, tbe PRA results could not be exact even to the flrst signiflcant figure, but they were of immense use because they could direct the design engineers to the parts of the plant where relatively small and easily engineered modifications would bring the biggest improvements in safety.
A few years after the time I have just been describing, a very severe accident did occur on a nuclear power station: on 26 April 1986 , the reactor of Unit 4 of tbe Chemobyl nuclear power station went prompt-critical during a lowpower test. The resulting massive spike in reactor power
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led to the reactor cover being blown off and uncontrolled radioactive releases continued for a period of ten days. I find it difficult to conceive of a worse nuclear accident. But how does it rank with other industrial accidents? 30 operators and frrefighters died within a few days, 28 of these from acute radiation poisoning. But what of the longer-term consequences?
Are thousands of people destined to die from delayed effects, as some television and newspaper reports have suggested? Given the important role that nuclear power needs to play if glo~al warming is to be ameliorated, this is a very important question for public policy, worldwide.
In fact, fifteen years on, the only long-term, health effect for which tbere has been clear evidence has been the undoubted rise in thyroid cancers amongst exposed children in Belarus, Ukraine and the Bryansk region of the Russian Federation. I became aware of this rise in childhood thyroid cancers in April 1996 after reading an interview with K.eith Baverstock of the World Health Organisation, which published annual figures for Belarus to the end of 1994 15 The problem was that the latency period for thyroid cancers caused by the ingestion of iodine-131 was not properly known, and the World Health Organisation felt unable to predict how many chi IdreD were likely to be affected. But as a control engineer familiar with statistical risk assessment, it seemed pretty clear to me that the answer must be implicit in the data already available. My best match to the data available in 1996 occurred when Tassumed that the distribution was Iognormal and carried out an optimisation exercise to determine the geometric mean and standard ratio. The optimal value for the geometric mean latency period emerged as 9 1/2 years. This optimal model 16 suggested a central estimate of about 1200 additional cases of thyroid cancer in the territories of the Former Soviet Union over all time in children under the age of 1s. The model also implied that the annual incidence should have been at or near its peak in 1994.
I am pleased to say that the predictions I made in 1996 using data to the end of 1994 have received a substantial degree of corroboration from incidence data that has just been published by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation in its UNSCEAR 2000 report to the General Assemblyl7. These new data advance the coverage to the end of 1998. (You may also notice that there have been some minor revisions to the earli~r records also.)
I think you will agree that, 4 years on, the blind predictions from the optimal model appear to be capturing the general trend well.
The UNSCEAR report also points to an increase in thyroid cancer for those aged between 15 and 17 at the time ofthe incident, although no increase has been observed in the adult population. There has been no increase in leukaemia, not in children, nor even in the accident-recovery workers, and this is particularly encouraging, because leukaemia is one of the most sensitive indicators ofhigh radiation exposure. Given the 90% or better success rate for early surgery on thyroid cancer, the final death toU from Cbemoby1might turn out to be in the hundreds, hopefully the low hundreds.
Such a loss oflife is high and tragic and all practicable measures must be taken to avoid a recurrence. Especial consideration needs to be given to the older, less safe reactors of the Fonner Soviet Union. And I would also like to put in a plea for greater support for those who have undergone thyroid Figure 7 : vCJD deaths in year to 30 June gland surgery, particularly for the regular supplies of thyroxin they need to live a full and active life. But the statistical analysis of the childhood thyroid cancer cases to date suggests that the loss of life at Chemobyl will be comparable with other major industrial accidents.
I find myself concurring with James Lovelock, author of the Gaia theory and himself formerly a VISiting Professor in Figure 8 : Rise in sporadic CJD cases after the National CJD surveillance Unit was set up Cybernetics, who has said 18 that to regard the accident, and I quote, "as ifit were the greatest industrial disaster ofthe 20th century" would be "an unnerving triumph offiction over science".
Which leads me to my final, eponymous topic. This concerns a food scare that took off five years ago. Front-page headlines on BSE and CID were a commonplace in 1996. And they are still generating headlines today. For example the front page of The Evening Standard of 19 October 2001 provided a "handy guide for ministers and scientists" labelJing photographs of each animal: "this is a sheep; this is a cow" -a reference to the mix-up in testing for BSE in sheep's brains, when cows brains had been tested by mistake. ever be possible. Second, it is a matter of fact that the annual records for vClD deaths since 1998 have been revised upwards retrospectively by up to 50%, and the predictions I have shown you do not take that into account. And just to give a further flavour of how increased surveillance can lead to an increase in reporting, the next slide shows the steady increase in sporadic CID cases reported after the ClD Surveillance Unit was set up in 1990.
I do not think that anyone would argue seriously that this apparent rise represents a real underlying trend.
So our calculations and the observations both suggest that we are close to or have passed the peak ofvCJD cases, ifBSE is the cause ofvCJD.
Those who argue that the number of human victims might reach very high figures (and such ideas have been floated to the national press and broadcast media with an unnerving frequency) will also need to explain the gentle fall in the number of deaths from vCJD in successive 12 month-month periods -hardly the profile of an escalating, so-called "epidemic".
Unfortunately by the end of April 1996, Government's attention had already become taken up with the massive cattle-slaughter policy it had just announced -the current response to foot and mouth disease must seem like an unpleasant case of deja vu for the UK's fanning industry. Besides, Government had started by now to regard the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) as its sole provider of scientific advice on vCJD.
SEAC's stance in April 1996 was that it was too early to estimate what the size of the vClD outbreak would be. I must tell you that such reservations did not deter the then Chairman of SEAC from remarking in an interview in September 1996 that the number of additional cases of vCJD could lie "between two more cases and 500,000"23.
And I fear that in the intervening years U ,25,26, and certainly as late as May 200]27,28, SEAC scientists were continuing to claim that it was "too early to say", while still raising the spectre of hundreds of thousands of human deaths. However, I am happy to say that at last there are some signs of progress. At the end of last month, SEAC Chairman Professor Peter Smith co-authored a study29 suggesting " a point estimate of the total number of infections of a few hundred, with an upper 95% confidence limit of about 1000." Figure 10 compares these "central predictions" with those we at City University had made some years earlier.
You will see that they are rather similar. This is not altogether surprising, as Professor Smith's team used ratber similar methods. It was just unfortunate that they did not chose to make reference to our own, much earlier work, of which they were well aware.
Indeed, -it now seems that SEAC scientists are rushing to reproduce our figures, using essentially equivalent methodology. Just last week the former Deputy Chairman of SEAC, Professor Robert Will, came out with a central estimate 30 But, as engineers working on projects with tight deadlines know only too well, there is a cost involved with late solutions to problems. The National Audit Office placed the post-I996 cost to the taxpayer at about a billion pounds a year 31 . I confess to being perplexed by the fact that a group of scientists consulted by Government on policies costing the 
And what about successive Governments that are prepared to accept the statement "it is still too soon to say", year after year?
Given that eminent scientists have been content to leave such an important question unanswered for so long, why do I find that it goes against all my instincts and education as an engineer? In trying to answer this question, I find myself reflecting that the engineer inhabits a world of new, unsolved problems that he or she is called upon to solve as a matter of routine. It is a most important discipline that the solution must work in a physical world, the laws of which will not yield to special pleading, and I believe that this fact induces both patience and realism in the experienced engineer. But it is also a feature of the engineer's environment that a solution must be found, often to rather a tight time-schedule.
This practised focus on flllding a workable solution may illustrate an important difference between scientists and engineers. A strict definition of science would suggest that scientists should be interested only in pursuing knowledge rather than applying it, although I accept that many scientists would surely dispute this as too narrow a description of the work that they actually do. But I would contend that the engineer's familiarity with and acceptance of the imperative to solve the problem qualifies him or her to make a distinctive contribution in tackling a wide range of questions both within the conventionally accepted area of engineering expertise and beyond it.
This contention, if true, should have implications both for commercial companies in their recruitment of engineers into the boardroom and also for Government in its choice of advisers on a broad range of important issues notionally unrelated to mainstream engineering.
Thank you for accompanying me on this journey from Haber-Bosch to Creutzfeldt-lakob, from "hard" engineering applied to industrial plant, through the deceptively "softer" areas of business systems and economics, and then on to risk assessment applied to nuclear power plants, to a real nuclear accident and to an ongoing food scare.
I hope that I have been able to convince you that engineers, control engineers in particular, have been able to make contributions in each of the areas I have mentioned, and that their education and experience in problem-solving qualifies engineers to provide distinctive advice on a wide range of subjects.
